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Summary
Commentators have asserted that “the existence of a genuine medical need constitutes a
moral claim on those equipped to help.” However, this professional duty is sharply
limited by the fact that resources are not available to help all the world’s patients with
each of their problems. At some point, boundaries are drawn implicitly and by force;
these boundaries can exacerbate inequalities and injustices, or they can contribute to
making the medical system more fair for everyone it serves. To achieve a more just result,
distributive justice must be employed, but any systematic way of allocating resources
depends on being able to define who belongs to a public and thus deserves treatment, as
well as what any minimum basic right to treatment should entail. By examining closely a
case of an adolescent undocumented immigrant who traveled from her home country
explicitly for treatment of a fast-growing tumor, we will explore a variety of ethical
concerns related to this dilemma in its historical and political context. Finally, a
pragmatic hospital-based policy to guide microallocation of expensive charity care will
be proposed in hopes of seeking a reasonably fair process to adjudicate this increasingly
common dilemma of politics, economics, and professional ethics.
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I. I N T R O D U C T I O N

1. MEDICINE, MIGRATION, AND MORAL COMMUNITIES
The subject of this thesis—whether and how to provide medical treatment for
non-citizen patients who require expensive hospital care but who lack funds and
insurance to cover these services—is a dilemma of global proportions. The number of
persons implicated in this problem is huge: of the 304 million people surveyed in the
2010 U.S. Census, about 7.1% of the population, or 21.6 million people, reported
themselves to be noncitizens—or, in the language of American federal law, “aliens.”1
This figure includes each of the 11.2 million undocumented immigrants estimated to be
living in the U.S in 2010.2 Furthermore, human migration is a phenomenon as old as
society itself. In the United States alone, it is a core feature of our collective history and
ethos, and immigrant communities remain a major influence on American social, cultural,
and economic realities today, despite the hostility often on display in our national
conversations about immigration.3
Most noncitizens lack eligibility for public health insurance based on criteria set
forth in federal healthcare policy, leading to inequities of healthcare access that are
unexplained by any factor.4 This norm has left states, localities, hospitals, and providers
themselves to render responsibility for these persons’ care, deciding in non-emergent
cases whether or not to provide expensive, potentially life-saving treatment at their
discretion, with a lack of professional guidelines about how to make these monumental
judgments.5
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Instead of consensus, there exists deeply-felt sentiment on both sides of this issue.
Despite numerous studies documenting how illegal immigrants underuse health services
compared with socio-economically alike legal residents or citizens, 6 these individuals
have become, or are thought to be, significant economic burdens to the localities where
they live and/or seek care. 7 For those politically opposed to immigration or morally
opposed to awarding public services to noncitizens, it is clear that any expenditure would
be too much. On the other hand, proponents of immigrant rights advocate compassion for
these politically disenfranchised, medically vulnerable persons living amongst us. 8
The stark disagreement about these individuals‘ moral status in society has
resulted in their being almost entirely excluded from healthcare policy. Hospitals,
therefore, are left with the problem of deciding whether or not to provide free
(unreimbursed) or charitable (funded by private charitable contributions) care to these
patients. This pressure can exacerbate inequities and therefore be unjust if not designed
with a reasonable set of principles and processes in mind. Therefore, hospitals face what I
believe is a moral duty to create a reasonably fair process for allocating the limited funds
it has to help those without access to funds or insurance, and to maximize the ability of a
community to care for those in its midst.
The problem resonates deeply with medical profession’s moral duty to care for
those in need, whatever their race, country of origin, ability to pay, or legal status. It is a
duty shared by many members of society: “so show your love for the alien, for you were
aliens in the land of Egypt.”9 But hospitals, healthcare systems, and society at large can
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not provide all services for everyone in need without encountering financing ruin. How
exactly to allocate these resources invokes the notion of justice as fairness. 10
But how should a society adjudicate this dilemma? Should we decide based on
their employment history, their duration of stay in the hospital’s jurisdiction, their
potential to contribute, or how many children they have? How do we define who belongs
to a community or a public which which shares some mutual responsibility for its
members’ wellbeing? The problem hinges on the insufficiencies of American health
policy’s ability to grapple with some realities in the world at large, even if they make for
unpopular politics, but this national and international problem has strong consequences
on a local level. Hospitals are increasingly being forced to make these microallocation
decisions in real time, without the luxury of waiting expectantly for a political solution to
the deeply divisive issues of immigration and healthcare financing.

2. CASE HISTORY
Despite the global proportions of this problem, for me it will forever have the
concrete form of a single Thursday morning at Yale-New Haven Hospital, when I was a
student member of a child psychiatry consultation team working in pediatric oncology.
When I walked out of the elevator onto the familiar seventh floor that morning, I knew
something interesting was brewing. Before my attending and I could put down our coats,
we were approached by two senior members of the unit’s staff. They were clearly
distressed. “Have you heard,” they asked,” about A.?”11 A., we were told, was 16 years
old, and suffering from cancer. She was also described to us as an “illegal immigrant”
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who might not receive treatment. The family might need our psychosocial services, we
were told, because they were “under unbelievable stress.” Her story unfolded piecemeal.
A. first presented to the emergency room of a regional hospital which is affiliated
with Yale. There she appeared lethargic, and she exhibited abnormalities in her cranial
nerve exam indicating a pathological process affecting her brain. Doctors learned that she
had been diagnosed with a “blood cancer” and had begun treatment at home in
Guatemala, but had stopped after two courses of chemotherapy because, according to her
parents, they could not afford to pay for treatment. They traveled to the United States on
what they described as a “work visa” which they had applied for and received some years
earlier. In Connecticut, A. spent one night at her maternal aunt’s home and was
subsequently taken to the emergency department of the Yale-affiliated hospital the next
day.
In the E.R., doctors noted her concerning mental status and learned about her
oncological history. They ordered a computerized tomography scan of her head as well as
as basic laboratory tests. These tests revealed blood counts consistent with a
hematological malignancy, and the scan indicated that it had probably invaded her central
nervous system. She was transferred to Yale-New Haven Hospital, where she underwent
more specific testing including flow cytometry to establish a specific diagnosis so that
she could begin treatment on a protocol. In the mean time, she received stabilizing
treatment including steroids and a dose of chemotherapy, delivered intrathecally, aimed to
prevent further neurological deterioration. The intracranial lesions were documented on
an MRI of her brain. She was admitted to the pediatric oncology service and diagnosed
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with Burkitt’s lymphoma—a tumor which is one of the fastest to grow and, potentially,
fastest to shrink. Her disease was assessed to be Stage IV because it involved her central
nervous system, and although this stage of disease is associated with a significantly lower
survival rate, her chance of survival was estimated as “at least 50%.”12
At some point after her admission, her hospital course began to veer off of what
would be expected for any 16-year-old being treated for a malignancy. Between her
admission and when she finally began protocol-driven treatment, she and her family
spent a few terrifying days waiting while the “hospital” decided whether this patient
would get the expensive treatment that could potentially save her life.13 In the mean time,
she also underwent surgical placement of a chemotherapy port, despite disagreements
between hospital administrators and her physicians about whether to do this before her
long-term plans were in place.
It was in this state of waiting that we found A., lying in bed, appearing deeply
asleep, with her mother and father at her side. As a group, we filed into the small room
where all the lights were off, and one by one introduced ourselves to A.’s mother and
father, using a mix of English and Spanish. They were huddled in the corner of the room
on the sofa, fit as close as possible to one another and to their daughter, looking sad and
frightened. We all stood and spoke in soft tones, reflecting their mood. A few new details
were acquired: A. seemed to be doing worse every day; the family was sleeping at the
hospital but had family in a nearby town; A.’s health had been fine until about four
months before, when she was seen for a recurrent sinus infection which turned out to be
this cancer; they had possessed their visa for “years” but traveled to the U.S. only days
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before; and the visa was sponsored by a relative in Arizona. Most of all, they had no
money but were willing to do anything and sign anything that might assure their child of
being treated. Outside the room, staff members were furious and exasperated, but also
spoke softly, as if discussing a secret. They must have felt powerless to help this young
person who was supposed to be under their direct care whilst a fast-growing tumor spread
in her body and in her head.14 A care coordinator informed us that she was not eligible for
any public insurance because of her immigration status, and that she was unable to send a
referral to a research site such as the National Institutes of Health or St. Jude’s Hospital
because she had already begun chemotherapy at home, and was therefore an unacceptable
research subject. Besides, she was neurologically deteriorating and needed treatment
immediately.
One team member reported that A.’s aunt, a former hospital nurse, had been
present during the week and that she was interested in doing anything that help her niece,
including having an ethics consultation. (It is unclear whether she proposed this or
whether she agreed to it when it was mentioned by a physician, nurse, or another person.)
I found her phone number in the chart and called her directly. She told me that she was
upset because she thought her cousin should be treated. She confirmed the visa story and
said they were living with her mother, and that their only other American relative is the
uncle in Arizona who had sponsored the visa. She was interested in meeting with the
ethics committee but said that she would be working long shifts for the next three days.
Our next call was to the chair of the pediatric ethics committee. He had already
heard some details of the case, but was unaware of the entire story. He was on the floor
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within a short time, and we all met with the family to gather more history. During this
encounter, I remember being distracted by how still the patient looked. She was not
moving in her sleep, not even blinking. I looked hard to see the covers rise and fall with
her breath. An email went out to members of the ethics committee, and a meeting of a
consultation team was scheduled for that evening, with a full committee meeting for the
following day. At the same time, senior hospital leaders met with the girl’s oncologist to
discuss the case. I asked whether I could attempt to secure legal representation for the
patient through the university law school’s immigration clinic, but was told to wait.15
Later in the evening, the ethics team delivered its recommendation to the hospital
administrators, which included a) instituting treatment on this patient without further
delay, and 2) devising a clear mechanism to guide these decisions in the future. (Cases
involving undocumented and uninsured persons were not uncommon to the committee; a
few years before, the adult ethics committee had considered writing a policy for cases
like this, which was drafted as an “Policy for Extraordinary Treatment,” but it had not
been developed nor approved.)
A. began receiving chemotherapy early the next day. The final word was said to
come from the hospital’s top physician, after receiving input from the committee.
Nevertheless, the ethics committee met in a full session that day to discuss the situation. I
joined as a member of the clinical team, which also included oncologists and department
administrators, as well as members of social work, child life, and child psychiatry. Three
of us were also on the ethics committee, balancing dual roles (but officially in the
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capacity of clinical team members). The patient and family was not present, by
committee choice.
The clinical history was presented by the patient’s oncologist. At a certain point in
his story, it seemed that he didn’t know what to say. I wanted to treat her, he implied, but
I didn’t have the power to do so. A senior physician reacted strongly to this sentiment, and
directed his anger at the lone administrator in the room, a former nurse who spends long
days (so I know from two separate experiences on the unit) securing benefits and tricky
placements for patients who might otherwise fall through the cracks. She, too, had her
hands tied by a senior administrator who was not present at the meeting. The case also
provoked a lengthy discussion on the adult ethics committee’s email list, which spilled
into an entire session of that group devoted to the subject.

3. THE POWER OF LANGUAGE AND FRAME
The problem of whether and how to treat noncitizens who require expensive care
is a direct result of connections and boundaries in the real world: the busy routes of
migration, travel, and trade which characterize the world today, and the legal boundaries
which define a nation and its citizenry. But just as these real boundaries define the root of
the problem, much of how the dilemma is understood and acted upon depends on the
language and frame used in the story itself. In other words, the way this problem is
conceived—as a problem of law, economics, or ethics—depends largely on the words
chosen in the narrative itself.16
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The first conversation in which this patient was described to me was exemplified
this point. “A teenage girl was just admitted. She came from Guatemala, and was
‘probably illegal.’” Immediately, her marked vulnerability and, at the same time, her
otherness were battling for moral status in the very same utterance. Her identity was split
incommensurably between these two roles: a deserving cancer patient, and a freeloading
medical traveler.
A recent front-page New York Times article, “Illegal Immigrant’s Transplant,
Cheaper Over Life, Isn’t Covered,” performs the same narrative split:
Without treatment to replace his failing kidneys, doctors knew, the man in
Bellevue hospital would die. He was a waiter in his early 30s, a husband and
father of two, so well liked at the Manhattan restaurant where he had worked for a
decade that everyone from the customers to the dishwasher was donating money
to help his family.
He was also an illegal immigrant.17
This fragment of the story begins with a clear appeal to the patient’s vulnerability:
without the transplant he would die. This sentiment deepens as the man’s social ties are
described, and we are led, by the end of the lead paragraph, to feel how he became so
beloved while working his laborious job that people who should be mere strangers to him
were eager to help him and his family.
Narrative analysis of the news reports of the case of Jesica Santillian, the 17-yearold Mexican immigrant who received two heart and lung transplants at Duke in February
2003, thereby causing a public controversy about citizenship, charity, and the goals of
medicine. The news depicted Jessica in similar polarities: either as “America’s angel” or
a “thieving devil.”18 Something befell the waiter from the Times story and to A. as well.
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Commentators on this phenomenon have called our attitude towards these individuals one
of ambivalence and irresolvable conflict between “sympathy and exclusion,”19 or
“compassion and repression.”20 The ends of the spectrum are well thought out, but the
middle—where one might find a hard, pragmatic, imperfect, but potentially reasonable
solution satisfying a variety of parties—remains elusive to characterize.
These stories also struggle between multiple seemingly incommensurate frames
of reference. Does the dilemma result from federal policy, from our economic
sensibilities, or from our sense of moral responsibility? As physicians or citizens? During
the adult ethics committee’s discussion of A.’s case, the frame was one of economic loss
and personal irresponsibility. The story of another recent patient was told by a hospital
administrator on whose desk these difficult dilemmas often land:
We had one woman from Mexico who was here in the hospital for a year getting
dialysis. No outpatient facility would accept her because she was an illegal
immigrant and had no insurance and no money. So she lived on a hospital floor
for a year, and we spent more than a million dollars on her. We asked whether she
had relatives or anyone who would help pay or take responsibility for her, but she
said no. We came up with plans to send her home to Mexico, but she said she
wanted to stay, and we couldn’t do anything about it. Finally, we convinced her
to go, on condition that we would pay for her to be transported and reintegrated
into the community at home in Mexico, where her dialysis would be covered by
the country’s national health insurance. When she got to the airport, there were a
dozen family members and others cheerfully waiting for her.21
But the denial of treatment is not always in society’s best financial interests. The Times
story highlights this problem of political norms creating an economic inefficiency:
So when his younger brother volunteered to donate a kidney to restore him to
normal life, they encountered a health care paradox: the government would pay
for a lifetime of dialysis, costing $75,000 a year, but not for the $100,000
transplant that would make it [dialysis] unnecessary.22
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This extra cost was a direct result of the norm that noncitizens are ineligibile for
transplantation reimbursement. Programs can elec to transplant noncitizens, though at the
risk of financial loss and potentially of audit by the transplantation center licensing
body.23
In the article, the focus shifted from the man’s plight to the cost of keeping him
alive; the debate assumes a familiar tone of decrying waste. Inefficiency is not an
injustice, per se, but it does exacerbate injustices by making resources even more scarce,
which is disproportionately burdensome on the poor.24 The story also highlights an
injustice in the organ allocation system, which tends to disfavor making immigrants
recipients while accepting them disproportionately as donors.
The financial frame of reference is omnipresent in our healthcare discourse on
policy, in patient care, and even in bioethics. It is easy to interpret a noncitizen’s plight as
a mere financial liability in a healthcare system where cost savings has become a core
value of reform. For example, the chief executive of an Alabama hospital described his
optimism surrounding the passing of his state’s strict 2010 immigration law:
I certainly think [a decrease in healthcare costs as a result of the healthcare law]
has the opportunity to occur across the state [because] the majority of illegal
immigrants have no health insurance. [...]
Bad debt and charitable care are one of the biggest challenges both locally and
across the nation given the economic climate. There is certainly the possibility for
both of those to decline given this new law.25
What is most remarkable about this statement is how it relates utilization of charity care
to mere financial loss, without much regard for the social value of this care. No spending,
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however small, will be considered valuable, reasonable, or even tolerable when seen
through a narrow lens where charity is synonymous with waste.
By contrast, the story can be told in words amounting to a humane appeal to
professional responsibility. During the ethics committee’s meeting, after this patient had
already been approved for chemotherapy, a pediatrician and committee member posed the
following question: is there any patient in the world who is more vulnerable to us than a
minor, experiencing mental status changes undermining her agency and ability to speak
for herself, lacking any ability to speak English, who has no money nor access to
reimbursement through public or private insurance, and who is suffering an extremely
quickly-progressing, expensive-to-treat, and yet highly curable disease? Hearing this
formulation from my colleague threw the problem of an illegal immigrant wanting
treatment into another frame altogether: the problem of a person, and a child at that, who
needs care we are technically able to provide. Simply reframing this issue as one of moral
responsibility and not economics or politics opened a new kind of conversation, and with
it a new feeling about the case and the persons involved.
Unfortunately, this shift split the problem in a new way, which was equally
oversimplified. It unfairly characterized physicians as advocates and administrators as
impediments to this advocacy. In truth, there were no immoral actors in this play; just a
lot of people—a whole institution, even—who were unprepared to make a quick, difficult
decision based on, and simultaneously challenging our idealizations of, the principle of
justice.
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4. CENTRAL QUESTIONS AND METHODS
Reflecting on A.’s case, a number of questions jump out with a kind of social and
moral electricity. What exactly makes a person illegal, and—more to the point in the case
—were we absolutely sure this patient’s residency was illegal? What evidence did we
have? It is not too easy for the term to catch onto a person, like a virus, whether or not
their immigration status agrees?26 If they are truly “illegal” in the way our nation’s laws
define it, what responsibilities should a physician, another clinician, a hospital
administrator, a hospital have to reinforce these laws, at the expense of treating the ill?
Should noncitizens without access to money or insurance be considered distinct from
citizens who do not have such resources, for the purposes of allocating healthcare
resources? What larger responsibilities to a public, whose goals include taking care of its
own, are relevant when an “outsider” breaks its ranks?
I intend to address many of these concerns by way of analyzing the central
question in A.‘s case: what is our obligation to patients who travel to this country
explicitly for the purpose of receiving expensive, life-preserving treatment such as cancer
care, organ transplantation, or dialysis? By looking at this less proximate (compared
with citizens or longtime residents) moral claim on a community’s resources I hope to
illuminate various norms and dynamics comprising this debate, while providing specific
guidance to institutions facing a range of similar dilemmas, and suggestions of how to
fairly and reasonably operationalize and govern these cases.
In order to do so, I will begin in Chapter II by documenting the ambivalent ethos
of charity present in the American medical profession’s professional ethics and in
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changes in the form of healthcare delivery throughout the past century. Then, I will turn
to Yale’s own history to articulate the competing interpretations of what a hospital is—
moral community, fiscal one, community organization, private business, and so on.
Finally, I will review recent American healthcare policy affecting reimbursement for
hospital care of noncitizens, as well as the status of these individuals in recent health
reform, and the status of health in recent state-level immigration reform.
In chapter III, I will focus on the ethics of the clinical problem of allocating
presumably scarce resources to noncitizen patients requiring expensive hospital care. By
deconstructing a set of common positions, I aim to show how complex the notion of
belonging to a community is, and offer my take on which principles should be followed
in performing these microallocation decisions. I will subsequently present a draft policy
aimed to guide governance of this issue from within the hospital, including a statement of
need, a set of essential principles (meant to be a practical distillation of chapter III), and a
proposed process for making these difficult, imperfect microallocation decisions in real
time. This process will incorporate substantial scrutiny of how these principles are
operationalized and governed within the complicated moral community of the hospital,
where power can so easily alter one’s experience of life and death.
I will conclude with a discussion of some inherent flaws in this pragmatic
approach, and a recommendation for how this case my be more justly framed and
governed in public policy.
In order to address these complex issues, I will employ evidence from history,
politics, law, and public health in order to objectively explore this issue from all sides. In
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my ethical analysis, I will contend with a variety of positions which lead me to the
original hospital policy found in Chapter IV. My research has spring from a previous
draft of a possible policy for “extraordinary treatment,” as well as extensive debate on
this topic conducted by members of the adult and pediatric ethics committees at Yale, but
this hospital policy has not been seen, discussed, approved, or used by Yale in any
respects. It is my own original work, intended as a work of scholarship and as one
suggestion for how a place like Yale-New Haven Hospital may strategize its use of
charity funds in these increasingly common cases. Since the charity funds possessed by
Yale have diminished in recent years (see Table I) while the population of uninsured
persons and noncitizens living here grows, I believe the hospital has a duty to judiciously
plan out its approach to the problem of noncitizens—both newly-arrived and wellestablished ones—who need expensive, often life-preserving, care, in order to minimize
confusion and injustice.
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II. C H A R I T Y C A R E A N D T H E N O N C I T I Z E N :
HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL ROOTS IN AMERICAN MEDICINE

1. CHARITY AND NONCITIZENSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
American Medicine’s Founding Ethos
The 1847 document “Medical Ethics of the American Medical Association,”
published in the year of the guild’s formation, has been used by commentators as
evidence of how the notions of charity, beneficence, and equity are present at the roots of
American medicine. Hoffman (2006) cites references to “eleemosynary [charitable]
services”; to the idea of caring for “indigent” patients; and to providing services with
“gratitude, thusly accorded.”27 In her essay, as in the public imagination, the American
medical profession has at its origin a strong ethos of service, an ethos which has been
gradually corrupted by exclusionary federal policy, by the rise of biomedical technology
with its focus on research and progress, and by managed care with its emphasis on
economic efficiency—each at the cost of human values within the profession.28
However, a close reading of the 1847 Code of Ethics shows that the obligation to
care for the underserved is articulated in strong tension with various other factors, such as
the “dignity of the profession” and the notion of justice. All in all, the duty to care for
those in need is articulated as a limited one wherever it occurs in the text. For example,
the 1847 Code says:
There is no profession, by the members of which, eleemosynary [charitable]
services are more liberally dispensed, than the medical, but justice requires that
some limits should be placed to the performance of such good offices.29
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Charity is not presented as a moral duty, but simply a fact of the profession, not worth
pushing as a guideline.30 Furthermore, the passage continues by acknowledging—in the
very same sentence, without a full stop to separate these ideas of obligation and
boundaries—that limits should be recognized as inherent to the idea of charity.
This statement may contain a variety of moral suggestions, among these that
fairness to the profession means fair renumeration. This stance would help the AMA
secure the economic and social status of the profession for many decades to come.31
Furthermore, by acknowledging that “some limits must be placed,” even members of a
profession which is known above all others for its commitment to helping those in need,
are not positioned to alleviate all the suffering around them, nor can the profession be
expected to solve all the injustices in the world. A provider should not be expected to
dedicate his whole practice to volunteerism, lest it be utterly unsustainable, forcing him
to abandon those to whom he dedicated himself in the beginning. In other words, charity
should not overwhelm the profession’s viability.
And nor should it tarnish its character. In “Duties for the Support of Professional
Character,” the 1847 code states: “It is derogatory to the dignity of the profession [for a
physician to be seen] publicly offering advice and medicine to the poor gratis.”32 This
prohibition suggests a way of doing charity care that occurs under the table:
Neither institutions endowed by the public or by rich individuals, societies for
mutual benefit, for the insurance of lives or for analogous purposes, nor any
profession or occupation, can be admitted to possess [...] valid claims for
gratuitous services.”33
One possible interpretation is that the practice of providing free care to those in need was
so common in mid-19th century medicine that the code needn’t make a point of
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physicians’ responsibility to provide this service. But charity is also presented as a threat
to medicine’s status and security, something worth hiding and downgrading, an
inconvenience in the rise of political, scientific, and moral status of the profession. There
is a fear, moreover, that “rich individuals” and the companies offering “insurance of lives
or for analogous purposes” will by default avoid sharing the responsibility to care for the
underserved of the day.34 There is even a danger that the virtue of beneficence will be
capitalized upon by the wealthy: the AMA advises that physicians who should “should
not give advice gratis to the affluent; because his doing so is an injury to his professional
brethren.”35
All in all, the code articulates a physician’s duty as limited with respect to his
deserving patients, and to the society at large wherein he operates:
The office of a physician can never be supported as an exclusively beneficent one;
and it is defrauding, in some degree, the common funds for its support, when fees
are dispensed with, which might justly be claimed. 36
Of note, a physician’s duty to the “welfare” and “benefit of the community” is frequently
mentioned,37 but nowhere is there any discussion of who exactly qualifies for this right.
Nor to the status of immigrants, refugees, noncitizens, or other persons of need whose
social class would disqualify them from the social programs of the time.
The 1847 statement articulates a clear ambivalence about charity: it is one of
medicine’s core values, but it is potentially an economic and political hazard and a
temptation to veer from realistic practice, which in 1847, as today, involved economic
sustainability.
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Professional Codes Today
Current professional codes articulate the same kind of ambivalence expressed in
the 1847 document. The AMA’s Principles of Medical Ethics, first adopted in 1957, does
declare that “a physician shall support access to medical care for all people.”38 However,
this notion was prioritized at the very bottom of the document as the ninth principle of
nine. Similarly, the more extensive “Code of Medical Ethics” of the AMA states that “all
physicians should work to ensure that the needs of the poor in their communities are met.
Caring for the poor should be a regular part of the physician’s practice schedule.”39 But
this incitement is filed deep within the code in Opinion 9.065, below entire sections on
“Fees and Charges,” “Continuing Medical Education,” and “Free Choice,” which states
that “free choice of physicians is the right of every individual.”40 Nevertheless,
physicians should accept “a part of the responsibility for the medical care of those who
cannot afford essential health care." 41 Similarly, The American College of Physicians
(ACP) Ethics Manual (2012) states, in its section on “Financial Arrangements,” that
“Each individual physician is obliged to do his or her fair share [...] to provide services
for uninsured and underinsured persons” based on “their professional obligation to care
for the poor.”42
Other professional statements do go somewhat further than the AMA’s does in
recognizing the duty to perform charitable practice. American Association of Family
Physicians engages directly with the political realm, specifically opposing laws requiring
physicians to report unauthorized immigrants or criminalizing the care of these persons.43
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2. HOSPITAL CHARITY IN AMERICAN MEDICAL HISTORY
Early Hospital Charity
From its roots in the hospitals and medical schools founded more than a century
ago, American medicine has been organized around the notion of charity, meaning
providing care to those who can not afford it. Yet the very same institutions displayed
sharp boundaries around who deserved such care, what it would entail, and where and
when it would be provided. By examining the recent development of healthcare policy
affecting both authorized and unauthorized noncitizens living in the United States, I aim
to illustrate how this ambivalence about the virtue of beneficence has carried through in
the modern healthcare system, thereby framing the social dynamics and financial
pressures shaping medical practice today.
Around the time of the 1910 Flexner Report, American academic hospitals usually
incorporated charity into their educational offering and clinical services. 44 The impulse
may not have been entirely altruistic. In his history of the American medical profession,
Starr (1982) writes that the notion of charity was wrapped tightly in social status, as well
as in a moral agenda. He describes how the “wealthy transformed charity dollars into
social status; by participating in the social good, they could also push a social agenda.”45
At the same time, these charity institutions began to transform in their essential quality.
What was really happening to the hospital at the turn of the 20th century, Starr argues,
was its “reorganization [...] along the lines of a business rather than a charity.”46
Does a for-profit hospital, ostensibly focused more on business than charity, have
different measurable behaviors as a result of its primary mission? One study of 17 private
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non-profit hospitals bought and converted to for-profit entities between 1980 and 1992
showed that three years after the change to private status, a hospital’s ratio of
unreimbursed care to total expenditures did not change significantly. Most remarkably,
though, was that unreimbursed care was less than 3% for each type.47 This poverty of
services was also found in a study of Californian not-for-profit hospitals, where in 20%
failed to provide “community dividends” in accord with of the tax subsidies they
receive. 48 Another study factored in a wide range of expenditures and losses consistent
with the notion of “community benefit,” and found that 43% of these expenditures were
on discounts for private insurers. “This raises the question of why nonprofit hospitals use
the community’s funds for activities that transfer money within the community rather
than on activities that make the community as a whole better off,” the authors
concluded.49

A Local History at Yale
Burrow (2002) reports that Yale’s medical school and hospitals continually
“struggled” with their relationship to the community, and in general with the notion of
what he calls “social responsibility.”50 It was true that "local influences played an
important role in shaping the medical school," but these relationships were complex from
their very origin.
In 1810, the Connecticut Medical Society and Yale College collaborated to start
the Medical Institute of Yale College, which later became Yale School of Medicine.
Subsequently, a local state hospital was founded by local physicians and Yale faculty, but
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only one of its ten founding corporators, William Leffingwell, was a layperson who
represented the community more than the profession. 51 Because of doubts they
maintained about the proposed hospital’s commitment to New Haven and Connecticut at
large, the state legislature resisted funding this hospital as legislatures had done in
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and New York. In response, the New Haven Medical
Association formed a committee which declared that “the hospital shall be a charitable
institution and no physician or surgeon shall receive any compensation for his services."
This encouraged the legislature to supply $5,000 to the fund in 1826, thereby making
New Haven Hospital the nation’s fourth voluntary hospital, along with the Pennsylvania,
New York Hospital, and Massachusetts General Hospitals, each of which had similar
origins.52
The intention was to create a charitable institution, and the social norms
underlying selection of worthy recipients of charity were largely determined by those
contributing the funds. For example, during New Haven’s 1833 cholera epidemic, “the
Board of Health wanted the new hospital to treat cholera patients. But the hospital
directors claimed that [the patients’] character forbade admissions of patient with
communicable diseases.”53 This was common practice at the time:
Persons who were contagious, vagrant, or morally suspect were not welcome in
most voluntary [what has become non-profit or charity] hospitals. The mentally ill
and chronically ill were also not admitted. Rather, most voluntary hospitals were
for the "deserving poor," the citizens who could not recover in their usual
residencies (servants in fashionable homes, for example).54
The early charter at New Haven Hospital was no different.55 According to Burrow’s
history, the community reacted strongly to their own being turned away during the
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cholera epidemic, which "slowed popular acceptance of the hospital.”56 Physician groups,
for a variety of reasons, became estranged from the medical school and from New Haven
Hospital, leading to the founding of two more institutions—St. Raphael’s and Grace
Hospital.57
Early on, Yale College was the intellectual and financial center of the University,
while the medical school suffered from "chronic underfunding" and “the recurrent threat
of medical-school extinction.”58 This trend persisted until the technological
transformation which led to medicine’s ascendance in society occurred. In the 1960's the
medical school began to produce its own revenue, largely corresponding to the emphasis
on research, not clinical care. 59 At the same time, after World War II, the hospital declared
itself not responsible for community members who were unable to pay. According to
Burrow, Yale’s Director of Medical Affairs at the time "concluded that in reality the
patients—and appropriate third parties—were actually responsible for the cost of their
illness." 60
Now, Yale-New Haven is the largest distributor of charity care in the state of
Connecticut (see Table I). These charity dollars are largely spent as unreimbursed
expenditures from its Free Care fund, which is available to anyone, including
undocumented immigrants, who have been denied public benefits. The hospital has also
gone outside of its own walls to purchase equipment and services on a noncitizen
patient’s behalf, such as funding outpatient palliative care services for a pediatric
oncology patient and undocumented immigrant whose family preferred her to die at
home.61 The hospital could have chosen to keep her in house to merely lose the operating
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costs rather than paying or these services from another vendor, but they saw the immense
social value in granting this family their wishes during the final weeks of life for their
child.
These acts of charity have not come without considerable strife. The Free Care
program was created out of a scandal involving not an undocumented person but a
longtime New Haven resident. In 2003, a story ran on the front page of the Wall Street
Journal describing how a man named Quinton White, a 77-year-old former dry cleaner
from New Haven with kidney failure and heart disease, was being pursued by debt
collectors who were contracted by Yale-New Haven Hospital.62 He had owed $18,740
after his wife, who was diseased at the time of the collection efforts, had been treated
there in 1982. Subsequently, the hospital’s debt collectors engaged in a decades-long
pursuit of Mr. White employing what the article calls “relentless collection techniques.”
Mr. White’s home was subject of a lein despite his paying off $16,000 of the debt, which
by that time had grown to in excess of $50,000.63 At the same time, a series of classaction lawsuits involving individuals who were treated unfairly because they had no
access to the lower fee structure used by public and private insurers.64

3. AMERICAN HEALTHCARE POLICY ON CHARITY AND NONCITIZEN HEALTHCARE
Obligations to Benefit the Community
In 2008, Senator Charles Grassley began an investigation into the perceived
“evolution” of non-profit hospitals into businesslike entities in order to “hold nonprofit
hospitals more accountable for the billions of dollars in annual tax exemptions they
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enjoy.”65 Grassley’s investigation into the tax-exempt status of non-profit hospitals comes
long after a set of changes in the nature of how law defines a hospital’s duty to its
community, beginning with with “charitable care standard” which was written into the
tax code in 1956. This standard explicitly mandated that “the hospital must be operated
so that services are provided, to the extent of its financial ability, to those who are not
able to pay and not exclusively to those who are able and expected to pay.” In 1969, this
was replaced by current “community benefit standard.” It requires only that a non-profit
hospital must house an emergency room, unless one is already present in the
community.66
Grassley’s efforts, like the lawsuit filed in 2003 against Yale by the State of
Connecticut, rest on legislation which has come to be known as The Hill-Burton Act of
1946, which authorized funds for hospital construction to as much as half of the nation’s
hospitals between the law’s inception in and the last year of funding, 1996.67 Each
hospital that received funds was obligated in turn to provide what was initially described
as a “reasonable” amount of charity to those without access to services, and to those
living in the community where the hospital makes its home.68 These obligations are
known, respectively, as the “uncompensated care obligation” and the “community
obligation.”

EMTALA
The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act of 1986 (EMTALA)
protects a rudimentary set of hospital services for any person who needs them, regardless
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of citizenship status or ability to pay. This legislation was written to prevent cases such as
the one which resulted in Guerrero v. Copper Queen (1975). In that case, the Arizona
Supreme Court ruled in favor of a parent of two young children who had been forced to
drive 18 miles to a county hospital from the private Copper Queen Hospital in the border
city of Bisbee, Arizona to received care for severe burns they had endured in a kitchen
explosion at their home in Sonora, Mexico.69 The court found that the lack of citizenship
was not enough to deny these individuals emergency care, based explicitly on the fact
that the legislature had not defined whether legal citizenship or residency should be a
factor into the decision. The legislature and the courts both failed to articulate any moral
norm, and they ignored whether the patient’s legal status as minors should factor into the
decision, or into any just policy.
In order to protect patients from what had happened to the Guerreros, EMTALA
was passed by the U.S. Congress as part of Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1986.70 It established a limited right to treatment for any person requiring emergency care
or labor and delivery services, regardless of citizenship status, insurance status, and
ability to pay. As one co-sponsor of the bill said, "the practice of rejecting indigent
patients in life threatening situations for economic reasons alone is unconscionable.”71
EMTALA was a marked shift from most states’ legal precedents which held that hospitals
had no duty to care for such patients.72
Under EMTALA, any hospital taking medicare funding—nearly all of American
facilities—must fulfill two obligations for all patients with “emergency medical
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conditions” and women in active labor: provide appropriate medical screening
examination73 and stabilize a patient enough to enable transfer or discharge.74
Diekema (1995) commends EMTALA’s specific objective (“to establish in law a
right to emergency care") as well as its underlying norm (promoting the “equal treatment
of all individuals requiring care”). 75 However, for him the law contains two major
problems which merit review because these insufficiencies illustrate the significant social
pressures facing hospitals and noncitizen patients today.
Firstly, the law’s vagueness may subvert its intent to provide a common level of
care to all patients, regardless of social status. Because of “widespread confusion” about
actions specified by the law—what constitutes presence inside a healthcare facility,
exactly who performs the screening examination, and what is meant by an “emergency
medical condition”—there remains significant potential for separate, unequal, but legally
sufficient processes of screening, stabilization, treatment, and transfer for different
patients. For example, case law has found that being hooked up to telemetry devices
monitored by hospital personnel has been found insufficient to constitute “presence” by
courts, but driving onto a hospital parking area in a private ambulance does. 76 This
vagueness speaks to the difficulty of determining exactly when a patient enters into a
hospital which may need to assume responsibility for their care.
Secondly, EMTALA did not support the norm it establishes with any financial
strength, and subsequent sources of funding have been insufficient, time-limited, and
subject to inclusion criteria that exclude a considerable segment of the population of
noncitizens.77 For example, one key reimbursement mechanism, known as “Emergency
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Medicaid,” was authorized as part of the Immigrant Responsibility and Control Act of
1986.78 The program authorized temporary extension of benefits to individuals requiring
emergency care who meet individual states’ Medicaid criteria, which today largely
exclude all undocumented immigrant adults as well as legal noncitizens who have yet to
reside (and in some cases, to be legally employed) in the sponsoring state for a period of
five years.79 These barriers were strengthened by the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Act of 1996, also known as the “Welfare Reform Act,” which cut the funding
for health services benefitting noncitizens The bill “took away all federally funded
preventative preventative health care for illegal immigrations, while providing access
only for emergency services and treatment for communicable diseases.” 80

PPACA, Medicaid, and its Financing
During public debate of the federal healthcare reform acts of the 111th
congressional season which culminated in H.R. 3590, the “Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act” (PPACA), the White House was criticized for supporting
immigrants’ rights to healthcare. Specifically, they were said to support unauthorized
aliens’ participation in insurance exchanges, in the failed public option, and in the
expanded public insurance programs—in all the features of reform aimed to increase
access and decrease costs. The president himself carefully denounced claims that the
white house was going to cover “illegals.”81
The resulting legislation provides for a marked expansion of public insurance as
well as the creation of health insurance exchanges, but neither will benefit noncitizens.
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Since the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1986, Medicaid eligibility
criteria has excluded all unauthorized immigrants; after the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996, states were awarded the right
to experiment with eligibility requirements, resulting in the additional exclusion of many
legal residents who have not met durational requirements.82 Furthermore, by barring
immigrants from participating in state health insurance exchanges, they limit these
persons from a major solution to the dual problems of access to care and cost control.
(PPACA also provides for the creation of a contested individual mandate for coverage
which may apply to noncitizens.)
In general, PPACA solidifies federal policies systematically excluding
undocumented immigrants and many legal noncitizens from public insurance and
insurance incentives. Furthermore, as the dominant legislation package addressing issues
of access to care and financial concerns within the American healthcare system, PPACA
has made other inclusive federal solutions all but political impossible. This includes the
reauthorization of funds such as those contributed by the budget authorizations made in
1997 and 2003, intended to supplement Emergency Medicaid as a way for willing
hospitals to cover the provision of extensive services to noncitizens. 83

Recent State Policies
In 1994, 59% of California voters elected to bar illegal immigrants from Medical
and to institute a variety of measures discouraging these individuals from seeking
healthcare and other social services, some of which recruited healthcare professionals to
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aid in their enforcement.84 Despite passing by a comfortable margin, the law was blocked
by the California Supreme Court, based on the fact that immigration is the administrative
responsibility of the federal government.
However, immigration is often the financial responsibility of more local
communities, including counties and states. In 1996, one political leader acknowledged
the contradiction embodied by EMTALA, where federal mandates can come without
attention to their funding. In this case, non-enforcement of immigration laws was
interpreted to be a “mandate” to tolerate noncitizens in communities. “How can any
Member walk on this floor, deny the citizens of California the right to implement
proposition 187, without expecting California to come right back here and ask for $3
billion from the Federal Government annually to pay California for the cost of a Federal
failure?" 85 His solution, like many critics of laws protecting illegal aliens’ rights to some
kind of care, was to side with the voters of California, at the time mired in recession, to
eliminate such legal rights for illegal people.
Commenting on Proposition 187 in the New England Journal of Medicine, Ziv
and Lo (1995) argued that the law endangers the public health, denies care to persons in
need, and violates patient confidentiality in unprecedented ways.86 They also report how
the deaths of two individuals which occurred in the period between when the law passed
and when it was declared unconstitutional in California Supreme Court, appeared to be
the result of unauthorized aliens delaying the act of seeking treatment because of fears of
identification and deportation.87
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Today, similarly strict state immigration policies have begun to be instituted in
Arizona, Alabama, and Georgia where legislatures have made it a crime for nonresidents
not to carry authorized papers.88 These laws were opposed by educators, doctors, and
others on the grounds that they turned their professions into auxiliary support for the
government’s efforts to control the migration of persons.

Conclusion
Healthcare policy has affected the coverage of noncitizen patients in a few key
ways. Firstly, it has met increasing financial and social pressures with insufficient
economic resources, shifting the financial responsibility onto hospitals and localities and
thereby exacerbating bias against immigrants. Partially countering this strategy is the
EMTALA legislation which guarantees what might be considered minimally humane
treatment for these individuals, avoiding the moral catastrophes such as what happened to
the Guerreros and to countless women who feared that seeking hospital services at the
time of birth would put them at risk for identification and deportation.
Secondly, federal and state public insurance policies have articulated an
insufficient set of norms defining what it means to be part of the American community.
Legal residence remains the only factor represented in the law, despite the millions of
immigrants who remain here undocumented, and who may contribute significantly to
American communities through employment and in other capacities.
Finally, state policies such as the now-overturned Proposition 187 in California
and the 2011 laws in Arizona, Georgia, and Alabama which require the policing of public
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institutions have allowed the state’s interests in controlling the migration of persons to
become a core public value, and one that is meant to be shared, despite considerable
objection from physicians, teachers, and law enforcement, by the public servants and
professionals working in these communities, and by courts reviewing early legal
challenges to these legislations.
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III. E T H I C S

OF

H O S P I TA L C H A R I T Y C A R E A L L O C AT I O N

1. MEDICAL CARE IS NOT AN UNLIMITED RESOURCE
The history of Burkitt’s lymphoma is a compelling example of modern medicine’s
power to improve the lives of human beings. Between 1957—when Denis Burkitt
originally described a series of 38 Ugandan patients suffering from what appeared to be a
tumor of the jaw—and the present day, advances in chemotherapy and molecular
oncology have produced at least a fourfold improvement in survival.89 New proposed
treatments such as those using a monoclonal antibody—a potent symbol of recent
medical progress—provide even more hope.90 At the same time, those living in resourcepoor countries suffer a greatly increased risk of developing the disease and of dying from
it.91 These risks stem not only from viral and immunological factors (such as Epstein Barr
Virus infection and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome) but from socioeconomic
ones as well.92
Pellegrino and Thomasma declare that “the existence of a genuine medical need
constitutes a moral claim on those equipped to help.”93 Those equipped to help includes
the medical professionals who possess the knowledge and skills to cure or palliate illness,
and it includes members of the public at large, who must take some interest in one
another’s well-being, and especially in the well-being of those least empowered to help
themselves. In this sense, those equipped to help form a considerable number in the
United States country alone, where only one ten-thousandth of the population—just
14,000 families—acquire enough wealth every week to fund an entire course of
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chemotherapy and hematopoietic stem cell transplant (an efficacious treatment for
recurrent disease) for a child such as A.94
But Burkitt’s is only one type of disease, and a relatively uncommon one. It is
reasonable to think that our wealth might be used to provide for basic comprehensive
healthcare for all persons present in the United States—legal citizen or otherwise—but it
would be impossible to cover the entire population of the Americas, much less the entire
world’s population.95 Indeed, for however compelling each genuine medical need appears
to physicians and others in the helping professions, there exists a point at which the
ability to address these needs is circumscribed by resource limitations. At this point, the
moral claims of individuals begin to conflict.96 Any community operating under the
condition of limited resources makes decisions, intentionally or by default, about how its
resources will be distributed.

Concerns About the Nature of Money
Two criticisms of this formulation of financial scarcity are worth mentioning.
First, one can question whether financial resources are truly limited in the way that
organs or devices such as the mechanical ventilator or extracorporeal membrane oxygen
machine. Is money a reliable enough foundation for life-or-death decisions? Can it be
redistributed effectively? Unlike the physical substance of vital organs, which can be
cooled, transported to another county or state, and then given whole hog to another
person, money is symbolic and changeable, and potentially unreliable. Routine
phlebotomy may cost someone paying with cash twice what it costs an third party who
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has pre-negotiated their rates with a laboratory, though these procedures are identical in
terms of time, equipment, and expertise required to perform the job.97 And that is not to
mention the social and emotional issues which make money seem to be an unreliable
substance on which to build a system striving to achieve moral clarity.
Secondly, distributive justice is most just when applied to large populations and a
wide range of problems. 98 Even if the allocation process is confined to the hospital level,
it would be practically impossible to adjudicate every request for treatment which plays
into the hospital’s unreimbursed expenditures. Confining the task to only the free bed
fund dollars enforces clear boundaries of the system, and makes the task practical. But it
also further separates the problem from its root—inequities in the system at large—and it
involves a kind of selection bias for only the most expensive cases, which tend to involve
the sickest individuals. These individuals might be penalized for the severity of their
illness, when this can also be seen as a moral claim to be treated.99
These two claims contribute to a practical problem: if a policy were to be devised
for “expensive” charity care, what should be threshold which activates it? Is it reasonable
to set a quantitative trigger for such a policy, knowing that healthcare prices will probably
inflate, and a hospital’s ability to pay will also change over time? Is $50,000 of treatment
worth the same to a 90-year-old as it is to a 5-year-old? Is contributing that for them
worth the same to us, as a public?
Furthermore, what about the costs of not treating a person with expensive curative
treatment or surgery? It stands to reason that if a fair procedure were to be put in place, its
very success may result in a tragic death, however justified the death may appear to, or
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amy actually, be. To avoid making this situation truly inhumane, the hospital should
provide palliative care for patients for whom there are no charity funds. But the costs of
this care are significant: by one estimate, about $40,000 per patient with a terminal
illness, averaged over a variety of end-of-life scenarios.100 A person could never be
reasonably denied a $50,000 treatment with a reasonable chance of cure for a $40,000
course of palliative care with zero chance of survival. But there is some difference in
money which may reasonably justify this alternative.
However appealing these arguments are, it is key to point out that money—and all
its associated irrationalities and injustices—can not be simply set aside. A hospital must
operate in the financial realm in order to justify its beneficent mission, despite the
compelling myth of Asclepius, which illustrated how we hope for care and coin to be
separate.101 Additionally, the comparison with organs is illuminating. For however
concrete organs may seem compared with money, the supply of transplantable organs is
still thoroughly dependent on social values and public policy.102
Ultimately, neither concern addresses what should be done with an individual
patient presenting to a hospital which possesses a limited quantity of charity funds. Does
the symbolic nature of money obligate us to care for a patient like A.? Do the inequities
in our society? These lines of thinking reflect important work yet to be done within the
healthcare system, but they distract from the problem of what to do with A. given what
inequalities and absurdities of pricing exist within the hospital and in society at large.
These problems may indeed be at the root of her dilemma, but they can not be solved
quickly enough to prevent the tumor from consuming her. 103
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2. A POLICY IS NECESSARY TO MAKE ALLOCATION REASONABLY FAIR
A key worry about allocation is that whoever writes the policy will be able to fix
the odds in their favor, or set the social agenda underlying it. As discussed in Chapter II,
physicians and hospital administrators have historically used the their power to control
the allocation of resources, as well as the notion of charity itself, to push social agendas
unrelated to the health of the population at large.104
To address this fear, it is crucial that a policy be grounded in the philosophical
principle of justice. Specifically, it needs to promote equity (all persons having equal
opportunity to obtain a minimum set of resources, no matter what their social standing) as
well as efficiency (judicious use of resources in order to maximize their impact across the
population, especially for those of least means). These principles are critical because
health or healthcare is not just another good; health has special moral importance, such
that inequities in income and other financial resources can lead directly to injustices. 105 A
process should be governed in a way that promotes transparency and consensus in order
to maximize accountability within the process, and accord with the values various
constituencies that comprise the public. 106 It should also involve well thought out
processes of self-regulation or external review, and public accessibility.107

3. CARE SHOULD NOT BE WITHHELD BASED SOLELY ON IMMIGRATION STATUS
A situation of limited resources necessitates a fair allocation mechanism to ensure
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that justice is maximized when balancing the individual rights of each member of a
public. But how does one define a public? Do the rights of non-citizens always represent
less of a moral claim than those of individuals who possess citizenship, either by birth or
naturalization? What about legal immigrants or permanent residents, who are largely
ineligible for public insurance despite being in bounds of the law?
It is my contention that immigration status does not reflect the value of a person
in a community, nor does it honor the dignity of the medical profession’s way of
apprehending individual persons. The use of a legal and political norm to allocate
healthcare resources constitutes a threat to professional dignity and a violation of
professional ethics. Illegal immigrants should not be excluded from healthcare merely
because they are “illegal,” because doing so would mistake the state’s interest in
controlling the migration of persons with the profession’s aims to support the health of
patients and public at large, truly denigrating the ethos of the profession and its ability to
assess and to care for those in need.

Citizens’ obligations to the public
A key counterargument to this position is based in the responsibility that members
of a citizenship—including doctors and other professionals—have to that community’s
integrity. Like doctors, citizens have obligations to the public, including to its laws.
Proponents of society can say that the nation has a moral duty to keep its boundaries
intact. If members of a public are suffering because of inequity, the moral claims brought
by noncitizens may be seen as an honest threat to mutual care within the group.
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This “nationalist” argument fails because medical professionals have special
relationships with those for whom they care. 108 Furthermore, it disguises how citizens
and noncitizens both may be valuable residents of a place. As Dwyer (2004) points out,
"the narrow framework of the debate pits poor citizens against illegal aliens in a battle for
health care resources.”109 In some cases, treating some noncitizens may even produce
benefits for public, including the prevention of advanced disease (with its associated
costs) and control of infectious diseases.110
However, a patient such as A., however, suffering from a non-infectious disease
which is already advanced, does not not fit this public health benefit scheme. Therefore, a
justification for this treatment or withholding thereof must come from a source other than
the utility to society of treating these persons, such as their vulnerability or their inherent
value as human beings.
Another counterargument involves the nature of the national public from which
these patients are excluded. If individuals comprise the citizenry, and the government is
simply the representation of these individuals, then what is the moral discrepancy
between a medical profession and a government which administers to this public? Both,
in theory, are working in the best interests of the public; why need physicians dedicate
themselves against this nation’s immigration policy?
I contend that the public (whose health is a concern primarily of doctors) and the
state (whose integrity is a primary concern of immigration authorities and lawmakers) are
similar but that their differences in ethos and duty are critical in the noncitizen dilemma.
These differences are illustrated by the way that meaning is made in each domain. In law,
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“undocumented immigrant” signifies illegitimate legal status as a resident, a simple
breach of the law. However, in medicine, the identity of “undocumented immigrant” is a
risk factor for structural violence and lack of access to care, and a proxy for poverty and
all the health risks that condition brings. Furthermore, enforcing anti-immigrant norms
might compromise a physician’s ability to protect patient privacy—a small breach of
dignity—and it could potentially cause outcomes as disastrous as in capital punishment,
regardless of whether the physician was actively or passively causing death. All of these
problems accompany the mistake of confusing the state’s interest in controlling the
migration of persons for any reasonable goals of the medical profession.
Yet another argument for the nationalist position is that it is an arbitrary but
convenient way to distinguish people when some distinction must be made.111
Unfortunately, this does not acknowledge the profound vulnerability of these persons, nor
does it attempt to minimize bias which endangers just allocation.

Screening Citizenship as a System of Distributive Justice
Finally, some justify the use of characteristics such as legal citizenship status not
as binary moral judgment but as a way to define the public—in short, as a theory of
distributive justice. (The difference between these two may seem small, but it is the
difference between a law and a philosophic norm.) In this sense, it is clear that the use of
citizenship status fails as a matter of social science. By using citizenship to define what is
meant by the idea of community membership, we flatten a complex and age-old social
phenomenon of human migration into a simple binary class: are you or are you not one of
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us? The reality is much more complex: noncitizens contribute to the tax base, they
contribute to the workforce, and they endow a community with cultural goods. They may
even use fewer resources of social welfare compared with equals from a citizenship class,
and overall, citizens who are uninsured or underinsured present even greater financial
burdens to American hospitals. 112 It is clear that the nationalist position, as Dwyer writes,
“focuses too narrowly on what we owe people based on legal rules and formal
citizenship.”113

4. Alternatives to Citizenship: Contribution, Attachments, Age, and Vulnerability
If citizenship status is too vague and politically-charged for use in healthcare
allocation, what criteria would be fair enough to use? By way of finding a middle ground,
some have proposed that noncitizens should be allocated healthcare benefits based on
their contribution to society through work.114 This formulation is sociologically honest; it
recognizes that immigration is an ancient human phenomenon and that its regulation is
new and difficult to fully enforce. Furthermore, this formulation reflects how
undocumented immigrants may contribute significantly to the public in a number of ways
which deserve to be rewarded, including through taxes (especially local sales and use
taxes) and also through work. Often this work is that which few citizens will perform,
contributing labor on which entire industries may rest.
One striking example of the real contribution to the nation’s economy made by
undocumented immigrant workers occurred subsequent to the passing of the strict state
immigration laws in Alabama, Georgia, and Alabama during 2010. These strict policies
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created a severe labor shortage which some have called a “man-made disaster.”115 For
example, a North Carolina farmer who runs one state’s oldest and most successful
vegetable growers is at risk of losing his business because the laborers he now has access
to is limited to the more costly H-2A Temporary Agricultural Work Program program:
What too many politicians and people in the general public don’t seem to
understand is that these migrant workers aren’t taking jobs from American
citizens. I’d love to hire local labor, but they simply aren’t available. 116
Importantly, this farm owner argues that it is not the way they contribute tax dollars to the
community that define them as contributing members of society, but the way that they
form a crucial underclass on which the “real” members of society depend:
The migrant laborer who comes to work on our farm doesn’t pay taxes, but
doesn’t utilize tax-paid services either. But most importantly, what too many
people don’t seem to understand is that these migrant workers allow folks like me
stay in business and pay taxes.
All in all, the agricultural shortage illustrates one way in which immigrants do contribute
to a society, given that the key economic sector of an entire region was threatened by a
tightening of immigration policy. Perhaps most interestingly for a problem about borders
and boundaries, the shortages and subsequent economic impacts thereof were not
confined to the states in which these laws were passed: the entire region of the South,
from Florida to Virginia, has experienced these workers’ absence as an economic
detriment.117
Like immigration status, work should not be used as a simple binary factor, but
instead as one element in a rich description of how a person has spent their life, what
roles they occupy in society, and what attachments they have to people and places. To
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create a thicker description of contribution, Dwyer suggests formulating a taxonomy of
kinds of work and its diverse moral claims:
There may be important ethical distinctions, for example, among the following
groups: U.S. citizens who lack health insurance, undocumented workers who lack
health insurance in spite of working full time, medical visitors who fly to the
United States as tourists in order to obtain care at public hospitals, foreign citizens
who work abroad for subcontractors of American firms, and foreign citizens who
live in impoverished countries. I believe that we—U.S. citizens—have ethical
duties in all of these situations, but I see important differences in what these
duties demand and how they are to be explained.118
He does not elaborate on a system which takes these distinctions into account. Instead, he
advocates for awarding healthcare benefits to noncitizens based on their contribution to
society as employees. Putting value on employment effectively debunks the notion that
noncitizens are by definition not part of a functioning society because they contribute so
critically to the labor base. However, it is only one way to define how persons may
belong to a society, and as a general definition of public membership employment has
several critical flaws.

Problems with Employment Status as a Factor for Allocation
Firstly, the employment-insurance connection has received considerable criticism
because people may change jobs frequently, and because employers small and large
suffer from these costs.119 Secondly, many important contributors lack official status of
employment. O course, there are those working hard under the table, but what about the
stay-at-home mother, or the great aunt who performs daily childcare for three children
under the age of four? What about a person who can not find a job, but instead spends
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more than twenty-five hours a week volunteering at a community organization, such as a
soup kitchen, a parenting support network, or a library?
More importantly, using work as a way to determine who deserves benefits would
exclude from analysis those who can not or should not work, such as children, persons
with significant physical or cognitive disability, or persons with disabling mental illness.
While these persons may not be highly valued in the law which establishes American
immigration priorities, those who have already migrated to the U.S. present challenges to
policy because of their vulnerability and dependence. Many of these individuals, such as
children and some disabled adults, probably had no active role in the decision to
immigrate, so why should they be held accountable for the “crime” committed by those
on whom they depend?120
But just how to conceptualize children as members of a public outside of their
family unit, given their slowly-diminishing dependence on that unit, is opaque and
largely unexplored in bioethics.121 Outside their family membership, children do not, and
should not, work. Their vocation is playing, learning, developing their capacities as
individuals and members of groups. Every child, therefore, represents the possibility of
contributing goods—economic, social, and cultural—in the hopes, dreams, and potential
contributions their futures hold. (They also represent all of the detriments eventually
suffered at the hands of people).
Because of these uncertainties, I advocate a policy that avoids denying care to
children and other dependent persons by default, based on their vulnerability. However,
there may be a time when competing requests for care may need to be adjudicated. Does
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a child whose parents work have a greater moral claim on life-sustaining treatment than
one who does not? What about a child who was brought to Connecticut to receive care,
versus one who has been living here for three years? What about a six-year-old child,
versus an adult whose intellectual capacity is assessed to be around the age of six? These
difficult questions make up the hardest work of any person or community attempting to
define the norms of allocation. To borrow from the approach used by Daniels and Sabin
(2002), we will largely focus on making a reasonable process—getting the right hands on
deck—and allow those participating in the process to help refine the set of applicable
norms.

5. Preference May be Given for Geographical and Historical Proximity
Thus far, we have framed the dilemma as a problem of competing moral claims,
and distributive justice and competing moral claims. There appears to be a conflict
between citizens and non-citizens, but the tension is actually shared amongst members of
a society who contribute in a variety of ways which go unrecognized in their legal
immigration status. Two further elements in the story and background deserve attention,
related to the ethical appeal to proximity.122
Legal precedents may not define what is the most morally satisfying formulation
of belonging, but they reflect a fairly broad range of interpretations of what it means to
establish residence in a community. The Hill-Burton legislation, which obligates any
hospital receiving reconstruction funds, defines membership in a community by whether
a person has been “(1) living there with the intention of remaining permanently or for an

BLUM 46

indefinite period of time; (2) living there for purposes of employment; or, (3) living with
a family member who lives in the service area.123 By contrast, the state-based durational
requirements of medicaid mostly bar even legal immigrants from public benefits for five
years.124

Physical and geographical proximity
The moral relevance of proximity is typically thought of as a result of physical
proximity, as in Levinas’ appeal to the ethical primacy of a face-to-face encounter.125 This
situation translates into a way to judge between competing requests within a system of
allocation, when two patients differ only in their history of place. For example, A. came
to us directly from her home country for treatment, whereas a similar patient—let’s call
her B.—may have lived here for 6 years, attending school in a nearby town, before falling
ill. She may have done this through a process of legal citizenship, while C. overstayed a
work visa to become an undocumented resident.
Physical proximity in this community does seem to present a kind of claim useful
for competing requests, but it should not be an exclusionary criteria because of how
interconnected the world is, despite the norm articulated by strict exclusionary criteria for
public benefits.126 Upon posing more questions—such as whether patients from countries
that share borders with the U.S. have a bigger claim than those merely from within the
Americas? Would a Malaysian person, or an Australian person, be less deserving than a
Venezuelan, or a Argentinian?—the arbitrariness of distance becomes evident. All in all,
we may say that the world is indeed flat, but the attachments people make continue to be
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of strong importance, as are principles such as caring for the vulnerable—since those
with no roots anywhere may present a unique moral appeal to care.
As a matter of hospital policy, the institution’s approach to deportation can follow
along these lines, valuing genuine attachments to a place over administrative or legal
descriptions of belonging.127 Companies specializing in medical deportations may be
used only with care and oversight in order to ensure the patient’s safety and access to
treatment in their home country.

Spending Versus Saving: Proximity of Time
A second issue of proximity involves a class ethical problem of balancing the
needs of one real, present person against many theoretical, or future persons.128 Free bed
funds have operated as endowments, generating interest which can be sustainably applied
to their cause. But it is fair to keep this money for future persons?
In 2003, Attorney General Richard Blumenthal sued Yale-New Haven Hospital
for failing to honor its commitment to charity by “hoarding” the funds earmarked for the
poor.129 At that time, Yale had been spending around two percent of its free bed funds,
which totaled nearly $26 million at the time of the lawsuit (see Table 1). By comparison,
this was significantly below the state averages of that period, which were 2.8-7.8% in the
three years preceding the lawsuit.130 (In FY 2001, all but one hospital spent in the range
of zero to 31%; Griffin Hospital was the only one on record to spend 100% of its free bed
funds, or $251,190, on charity care.) Importantly, these hospitals were also usually
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eligible for reimbursement of these funds, shifting free bed funds to their general funds
pool via these reimbursement mechanisms and thereby “bypassing donors wishes.”131
There are several reasons by spending should be favored over saving. First,
market gains are uncertain. Secondly, healthcare is a special resource, and money should
be spent to maximize the health of those living today. Thirdly, spending funds may make
them scarcer, but spending has the potential to increase awareness of the need for charity
funds, and potentially encourage donors to benefit the funds at Yale, given the need for
continual donation. Finally, to justify withholding of therapy in the name of allocation,
money must be truly scarce, and not theoretically or potentially so.

6. Physicians Should Participate in Allocation Decisions, but Patients’ Own Physicians
Should Be Advocates and Consultants
Physicians resist the notion of distributing healthcare because it threatens their
notion of being advocates only for their patients’ best interests and, in general, of doing
good in the world. One popular formulation of this argument is that "we should recognize
no limits, in principle, to the sacrifice that morality can demand of us in promoting the
overall good."132 Similarly, the oaths endorsed today by many graduating medical
students tend to endorse this humanist norm with zero interference from competing
interests: “the health and dignity of my patients will be my first concern.”133
This position has a variety of benefits: it is simple; it focuses on individual
dignity, a universal value and the foundation of most systems of ethics; it ignores social
biases that threaten equity and justice; it is satisfying for clinicians to know that their job
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is untarnished by other obligations, such as to their employers, guilds, communities,
systems, or to their own idea of what a patient’s best interests are; it satisfies patients who
can feel that their best interests are being faithfully represented; and it preserves the
function of advocacy for physicians, whose myriad responsibilities have made advocacy
an increasingly difficult task.
Writing in a 2005 editorial in the Journal of Trauma, a head trauma surgeon at
one of the biggest public hospitals in Arizona, a state historically at the center of
immigrant hospital policy conflicts, appeals to his colleagues about the humanistic duty
to care:
I believe it is our duty to recognize the vulnerability of all injured patients in our
care and to continually advocate for the provision of excellent treatment.
Although JC was an illegal worker in relationship to our state and federal
governments, he should be viewed as a legal member of our community. Our
moral responsibility is to assure that trauma care is available to all individuals and
that a person’s immigration status, the color of his skin, or the foundation of his
religious beliefs does not diminish that responsibility.134
This is the ideal that a physician’s chief goal should be to honor the individual
relationship between themselves and their patient. To maintain this covenant, a physician
must detach the “ethical” or “professional” issues from the “administrative,” “political”
or “economic” ones, writes this surgeon-administrator:
Indeed, for society, what seems on the surface as an economic issue based on
access and payment of health care truly is an ethical problem based on social
justice and societal responsibility.135
His statement balances duty to individual patients with duty to society by adopting
positions of advocacy in both domains. This is a very appealing position, but one that
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involves, paradoxically, a distancing of the clinician from his case, because there are
already financially-based decisions affecting many aspects of the case.
Despite this idealization, physicians do occupy a complicated seat in between
individual and public responsibilities, and in some scholars’ findings, they are already
participating in significant allocation decisions whether or not they think they are.136 The
contradiction is illustrated in two professional guidelines from the American College of
Physicians. In 2004, a working group on managed care ethics wrote definitively that
“Resource allocation policy should not be made at the bedside,” while a 2012 guideline
on treatment decisions encouraged physicians to make “parsimonious” choices, in order
to minimize wasteful spending and maximize justice in the system at large.
All in all, I believe that physicians as a group should participate in the allocation
of resources because not doing so would be to decline to sit at the table where these
decisions are already being made. In general, physicians may bring to the process a
perspective of moral cognition that is rooted in close proximity to suffering. This very
bias has been grounds for criticism of physicians’ ability to balance the needs of a patient
with that of the overall good. However, another way of thinking about this “bias” is that
physicians’ values and reasoning are rooted deeply in their relationships of care.137 While
less “rationalistic,” including this perspective may ensure that the vulnerable patient is
being represented fairly at the table. 138
Ultimately, a patient’s own physician, such as the oncologist for A., should not
make the actual decision any more than he should sit on the ethics committee when they
are discussing a conflict in end of life care for one of his patients. It is a conflict of
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interest, a violation of the patient’s confidence, and of the consultants’ independent
authority. Furthermore, physicians should be emotionally entwined with their patients in
a way that would be devastating if they should have to make a reasonable decision not to
offer one a life-saving, but expensive and unreimbursed, treatment. It is possible that
serving this dual role would make the least ethical physician (in terms of their allocation
duties) the most attuned to their patient’s needs, and thus the best advocate.139
Ultimately, the consensus of his colleagues, of his hospital, and of the profession
at large—through professional guidelines that should be established—should unburden a
physician from actively playing this dual role, even if it occupies her somewhat in her
heart.140
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IV. A P O L I C Y F O R T H E A L L O C AT I O N O F C O S T LY
C H A R I T Y C A R E AT Y A L E - N E W H AV E N H O S P I TA L

1. STATEMENT OF NEED
Key missions of Yale-New Haven Hospital include providing health care services
to all patients regardless of ability to pay, and to provide support, services, and access to
care within the community at large.141 This mission is consistent with one of the aims of
the medical profession, which is to support the health of the public and to promote equity
in healthcare. Some of these services (such as those specified by the Emergency Medical
Treatment and Active Labor Act of 1986) are mandated by federal law and reimbursed in
part by federal and state budget provisions, but much of these services have historically
been awarded at the discretion of the Hospital through its charity funds—both donations
made explicitly to cover care for those in need as well as resources that the hospital is
morally and legally obligated to benefit the underserved and the community at large.
Because even a relatively resource-rich hospital such as Yale-New Haven does not
have the financial ability to provide all available services to all patients in need, there is a
need for 1) a clearly articulated set of principles of allocation of charity care within the
Hospital and the community it serves, and 2) a transparent process to operationalize these
principles into practice which governs charity care allocation decisions within the
hospital.

2. PRINCIPLES AND AIMS
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a. Balancing Responsibilities. The process of resource allocation aims to balance the
hospital’s obligations to individual patients with its obligation to the community in
which it makes its home. Individual physicians share this balance of interests, though
they are primarily advocates for their patients’ best interests.
b. Requirement for True Scarcity. The hospital must transparently and publicly report its
charity funds in order to prove the conditions of scarcity that would justify any tragic
outcomes associated with this policy. Physicians participating in the allocation process
need to know the details of the hospital’s charity finances, just as an oncologist needs
to know survival rates to accurately inform patients about possible plans of care, or the
ethics committee making a futility determination needs to know expected efficacy of
treatments potentially being withheld, since these statistics are largely the moral
justification for these serious actions.
c. Vulnerability and Prejudice. Intolerance has no place in the mission of the hospital or
the profession of medicine at large. Patients fitting these criteria (i.e. those without
access to resources or insurance) must be recognized, above all else, to be a severely
vulnerable and deserving group. Criteria such as race, gender, religious belief, and
personal values will not qualify nor disqualify any patient from consideration (though
an investigation of the patient’s social history shall be performed in order to assess for
their attachments and plans with respect to the community served by this hospital).
d. Federal Immigration Status is an Insufficient Criteria. Immigration status is a poor
proxy for membership in the community to which this hospital devotes its charity
mission. Simply denying care to immigrants regardless of their membership in this
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community would reinforce the state’s interest in controlling the migration of persons,
and not the goals of the medical profession which include supporting public and
individual health. Immigration status should be inquired about in the process of
identifying potential benefits, but it should not play a decisive role in allocation
decisions, and under no circumstances should this information be used to enhance
enforcement of immigration laws.
e. Diversity of “Public Belonging.” There is no one definitive definition of “deserving,”
of “community member,” or even of “resident” which will satisfy all cases brought
under this policy. Instead, this policy will establish a cased-based approach aimed to
achieve consensus amongst diverse members of the hospital’s constituency charged
with determining the allocation of charity funds. By employing a thorough
biopsychosocial formulation of the person’s medical condition, social situation,
existing and potential attachments, benefit to the public (i.e. in the case of infectious
diseases), and consideration of the circumstances that brought the patient to the system,
cases will be considered individually and comprehensively.
f. Preventing Delays in Care. If patients are already admitted to Yale-New Haven
Hospital, providers should initiate treatment (i.e. with an initial course of
chemotherapy, dialysis, or stabilizing treatment in advance of surgery) while this
process is being carried out in order to minimize risks associated with waiting to
deliberate. However, patients should not be transferred from other tertiary care
hospitals to begin treatment under this policy without approval. Beginning treatment
does not preclude discontinuation should the criteria of this policy be met.
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g. Valuing Spending over Saving. The aims of charity are to help improve the world as we
know it, not to save up for another world worth improving. The hospital should err
drastically toward spending charity funds in order to benefit existing patients rather
than theoretical future ones, even if it is possible in economic or philosophical theory
to produce more benefit at a later date, since 1) these calculations depend on a notinsignificant degree of uncertainty in investment return, and 2) the moral claim of
actual patients outweighs that of future ones.
h. Patient Responsibilities. All patients should partner with the hospital to accurately
represent their ability to pay for services. Information used in this proceeding will not
be provided to federal immigration authorities. However, a payment agreement will not
be necessary for treatment initiation, should treatment be authorized.
i. Physician participation. The committee is required to have in its constituency at least
one hospital physician-leader and one physician from each of up to two departments,
preferably departments involved in the care of the patient (though not clinicians with
direct care responsibilities). Furthermore, the primary physician responsible for the
patient being considered for treatment is encouraged to join the proceedings as a
consultant and patient advocate.
j. Addressing Competing Requests. Competing requests should be prioritized based on
expected benefit, projected cost, and deservingness with respect to the public directly
served by the hospital (i.e. long-time residents over those who immigrated for
treatment). In absence of these criteria, competing requests may be prioritized based on
a first-in-line method, or expected medical benefit.
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k. Treating Children and other Dependents. Minors and other dependent and
incapacitated persons should be treated by default. These conditions may not be used
to potential recipients from one another based on such concepts as innate
deservingness, societal worth, or utility.
l. Nonabandonment. Should proposed treatment be withheld, alternatives may be
considered, and humane alternatives such as palliative care, itself no small expense, are
always required if none of these should be decided upon.
m.Against Policing the Population. The hospital will always oppose regulation requiring
reporting of any undocumented immigrants to municipal, state, or federal authorities
for any punitive purpose. The hospital should not provide patient records, nor records
of these proceedings, to immigration authorities for the purpose of enforcing
immigration laws.
n. International Transfer May be Reasonable. It may be reasonable and parsimonious to
offer international transfer home (or to a country of citizenship) where a roughly
equivalent treatment is available, so long as a patient or his or her surrogate who
request or will agree to this service. If no agreement is reached, the hospital will not
transport patients out of the country against their will unless it is clearly established
through the procedure outlined in this policy that the patient’s sole attachments in this
country are the hospital. If no approximately equivalent treatment is available in a
home country, patients will receive care at YNHH.
o. An Imperfect, Necessary Solution. The problem of uninsured and underinsured
immigrant persons and citizens without any insurance is not a Hospital problem at its
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root, but rather a regional, national, and international problem; a political problem; and
a problem of economics and financing. Nevertheless, the hospital must make clear its
strategy in navigating these difficult yet inevitable microallocation decisions.

3. ALLOCATION PROCESS
a. A consultation with a charity care subcommittee (defined below) is triggered either
by initiating an endorsement process or crossing a financial threshold.
i. An endorsement process is reserved for patients in need of services such as
non-emergent surgeries, transplantation, courses of chemotherapy, or stem cell
transplantation.Two persons affiliated with the hospital, or one affiliate and one
member of the public, must endorse a patient for consideration of charity fund
support for either in-house or—in rare circumstances—outpatient services.
ii. The financial threshold is relevant for patients utilizing, or expecting to utilize
ongoing services such as dialysis or long-term ventilator therapy who are
unable to find suitable alternatives to hospital care. All care above $100,000
may be scrutinized for appropriateness based on the criteria outlined above.
b. A thorough biopsychosocial assessment is required for consideration, in order to
minimize misapprehension of the facts, and to uncover a patient’s attachments in
the community. The assessment will be performed by the patient’s primary
clinician, by any mental health professional (social worker, psychologist,
psychiatrist), or by a hospital ethics consultant. It should include a comprehensive
history including the following elements: history of present illness, including
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history before being admitted (or considered for admission) at Yale, and hospital
course; social history, including family history back at least one full generation,
with special attention to places lived and worked; educational and work history;
and any other relevant data, even if these data are difficult to obtain with high
reliability.
c. The charity care committee will be made up of members from hospital leadership,
hospital ethics committee, and patient services or care coordination.
i. Hospital representation. The committee must include at least 4 representatives
of different hospital constituencies, including: 1) Care coordination or finance
(1 member); 2) clinician leadership (1 member); 3) clinicians, preferably of
different departments (2 members).
ii. Patient representation (1 member). Because of these patients’ vulnerability, it is
critical that they have proper representation with minimal conflict of interests.
This role may be filled preferably by a lawyer working pro bono or a member
of a law school immigration law clinic; or, should the patient or her
representative prefer, by an immigration rights advocate’ or a community
advocate or representative from community, city, or regional leadership.
iii.Community Members (0-2 members). Preferably representing constituencies
not accounted for otherwise (e.g. racial, geographic, and/or socioeconomic
diversity).
iv.Physician Clinician(s). Participation in the case presentation by a patient’s
primary clinician is encouraged, but not required. A physician serving any
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direct clinical capacity for the patient in question may participate as an
advocate, but should not be present for the committee’s discussions or
decisions.
v. Family: Family members may choose to address the committee directly, but
they should observe the aforementioned boundaries outlined for clinicians.
vi.Consensus: Committees must reach a unanimous decision to withhold
treatment based on the principles discussed above.
vii.Appeal: A patient, family member, or clinician may appeal the committee’s
decision to the hospital chief-of-staff or his representative.
viii.Transfer: At any point in the process, including after a decision has been
made, a patient may request transfer to another institution, anywhere in the
world. If transfer is accepted by the receiving institution, reasonable expenses
will be shared by both institutions.

4. OTHER REQUIREMENTS
a. Records keeping. The hospital will keep detailed records of all cases deliberated in
this manner, as well as all charity expenditures during the active fiscal year
(previous years are already on file with DHS) for use by committee members.
b. Public Engagement. The committee must prepare an annual report with financial
statistics and the year’s entire history of brief masked case histories for distribution
to state and federal representatives serving this region of Connecticut, as well as
the director of Connecticut’s Department of Public Health and Medicaid/Title IXX
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Programs. The purpose of this communication will be to attempt to bridge the
profound gap between the actuality of these microallocation decisions as they exist
in the hospital and as they are represented and insufficiently addressed at the level
of state and federal reimbursement policy.
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V. C O N C L U S I O N

1. AN IMPERFECT BUT NECESSARY SOLUTION
Ultimately, a charity care allocation policy is not an inspiring moral document in
the way that the positions of duty articulated by those such as Pellegrino and Thomasma
are. “The existence of a genuine medical need constitutes a moral claim on those
equipped to help” inspires; the notion that some people may die because the hospital (and
we as a public) can’t afford to pay for effective, otherwise available treatment, is utterly
depressing. It is tempting to focus instead on advocacy in the public domain, or in the
community at large, the way that some Yale physicians have.142 Why not drop all this
ratiocination and dedicate oneself to increase the resources on hand by lobbying in
Congress, or addressing other barriers to care?143
The likely truth—admittedly lacking hard evidence to prove that this is the case—
is that these decisions are being and will continue to need to be made, but that they are
made in quiet.144 Calabresi (1978) has argued that this is so because revealing these
deliberations to the public gaze would be morally intolerable.145 This feeling was evident
in the response to the public allocation of renal dialysis performed by the so-called “God
Squad” in the earliest phase of these treatments’ existence.146 Even though the committee
included non-clinicians such as ”a lawyer, a minister and a homemaker” in its ranks,147 its
use of questionable notions of social justice such as “good citizenship” was seen as an
affront to medicine’s ethos, and the value that the public placed on an impartial healthcare
profession.148 No consensus, this historical situation would seem to signify, could
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reasonably stand for the consent of each and every different individual to submit to the
squad’s formulae.149
Without returning to the social judgements of the God squad, it is possible to
adopt a process such as the one I have articulated which will 1) promote transparency of
resource availability, in order to justify its serious aim; 2) specify and operationalize the
concept of justice as equity, in order to promote respect for all persons, and especially for
those with few means and other vulnerable groups; and 3) allow these decisions to be
made in view of the profession and of the public at large, in order to promote an honest
sense of the problem. These aims, I believe, are reasonably satisfied by the process set
out in Chapter IV. But they are not satisfied perfectly, and the process’ flaws are critical to
foresee lest this work be used—unintentionally or otherwise—to exacerbate inequity and
justify bias against noncitizens requiring expensive hospital-based care.

Major Flaws of this Solution
In general, the policy presented here makes it very difficult by default to decline
to treat anyone based on a simple notion of membership in the community served by the
public, even the global community at large. The discussion in chapter III regarding the
insufficiencies of various legal or administrative ways to define belonging is intended to
lead readers to the conclusion that there are many ways to belong, or many ways for a
community to justify wrapping its arms around a person in desperate need—independent
of their citizenship status, local tax contributions, employment history, and so on. But as
the shortage of charity dollars decreases (as it is tending to do at Yale and in many places,
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based on the policy changes described late in Chapter II, and the data illustrated in
Appendix I), there will be pressure to adjudicate more and more competing moral
demands on a limited set of resources. This will lead to two major flaws inherent in this
practical, hospital-based solution I have proposed.
One major problem surrounds the complexity inherent in the notion of citizenship,
and the pragmatic goals of a hospital policy— major points in tension within this work.
To adjudicate between competing demands—a situation likely to be more prevalent as
funds run out (see Appendix I, as well as Chapter II)—a committee may need to use
aspects of the comprehensive biopsychosocial formulation presented in this policy (see
Chapter IV, item 3b), since it is unlikely that these difficult decisions will be able to be
made entirely on expected medical benefits or other ways of measuring the non-social
value of treatment. These psychosocial data were intended to be generated to protect
these persons from prejudice and misunderstanding; however, they could be come tools
of care denial. Indeed, this would even be more just, based on the reasoning in Chapter
III, than a simple determination of legal citizenship status or accounting for taxes
contributed to the locality. While it would be grossly unethical to apply such criteria as
race, gender, or socioeconomic status in an allocation scheme,150 some measure of
citizenship—not legal citizenship, but some way to formulate real citizenship—may be
warranted as a marker of who belongs to the public which shares some basic
responsibility for its members well-being. Can a complex notion of citizenship be
reasonably formulated in this process? If it does, will it satisfy providers’ sense of moral
distress at the need to make these difficult decisions? Moreover, who would agree to
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these assessments if they know that they would be used to deny them care? Would a
person’s consent be valid if they were told that they would only be considered for
treatment if they spell out their life history? Would psychiatrists and other psychosocial
professionals generating these formulations be willing to do so, for the express purpose of
allocation?151

Confusing the Locus of Responsibility
A second flaw is that this work attempts to strike a pragmatic balance between the
moral and economic frames of reference, as well as between the individual and public
responsibilities that physicians, hospitals, and others in scenario all share. It is true that
these clinical cases are too easily seen as purely economic or legal disagreements, and not
as moral dilemmas (see pp. 10-12). By taking for granted the conditions of economic
scarcity which both create the need for an justify the process of allocation, this troubling
economic frame has been justified somewhat. The key danger is that a fair policy will
obviate the need to address the root problem here, of economic injustice.
Similarly, the hospital policy solution mistakes an international problem for one
that can be addressed by a hospital alone. But, working at the level of the hospital may
allow for the kind of nuanced moral reasoning that is simply impossible to perform at the
level of our national political debates. The kind of nuance that regards the circumstances
of a person’s immigration as important without fitting these circumstances into rigid
criteria for or against inclusion in a public insurance plan, as much a barrier to access and
fairness as the durational requirements of Medicaid have become.
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These significant problems are probably chief amongst the proposal’s flaws.
There are several checkpoints in the system that allow reasonable members of the
hospital constituency to affect the process. For example, whoever writes the psychosocial
formulation must agree to do so in good professional conscience; consensus must be
reached unanimously for care to be denied; and this process can not take the place of
comprehensive care coordination to find other resources in this country and beyond to
provide the patient with appropriate care.

2. WHO SHOULD PAY?
The foregoing flaws of this policy’s limited scope are accompanied by one major
problem: who might bear the costs of this treatment, or even more importantly, who
should pay for these individuals’ care.
Without a sustainable source of funding from the federal governments or from
private donors, the situation of scarcity will only worsen, and there will be more social
pressure to exclude noncitizens from healthcare, when everyone is suffering. This may
further threaten the ability of a hospital to embody the moral norms of the profession of
medicine rather than of the society at large.
The most direct solution would be to promote federal and state policy that
rewards hospitals for providing charity care. This would be politically preferable
compared with allocating public benefits to noncitizens, because it would place the moral
compass in the hands of the hospital itself, who can then define what it means by
belonging to the public it serves.
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However, in absence of these funds—or if the funds were secured but applied
inconsistently throughout localities or between states, leaving some noncitizens more
vulnerable to political conscience than others—a mechanism could be used to promote
allocation between localities within a regional or national network. The comparison to the
mechanism employed by UNOS is useful here. As a public, non-governmental body,
UNOS has a national mandate, a broad consensus, and yet some degree of insulation
from national politics. It has developed a formula to adjudicate between competing
demands based on time waiting, medical need, and expected utility of the therapy, but
also uses psychosocial criteria such as ability to cope with and care for the transplant, as
well as citizenship status itself, in the name of the greater good.152
A UNOS-like system of information sharing that preserves the local relevance of
these problems while promoting a centralized mechanism to connect persons requiring
various expensive treatments could help to account for hospitals’ charity care
expenditures and to coordinate for care when a particular locality is unable to meet all its
constituents’ needs. Free medication programs currently offered by pharmaceutical
companies could be coordinated through this gateway, along with free treatments
associated with research protocols and with charitable care.153 This solution would not
provide sufficient funding for this care—that would have to come from other federal and
state legislation, from hospitals’ own duties to care for the indigent in their community,
and from charitable donations from individuals and from corporations—but it would
provide a way to reach more people and to account for the actual needs of this
population. By accounting for charitable donations from a variety of constituencies in
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healthcare the burden of free care could be spread widely not just geographically but in
the healthcare marketplace.

Truth or Consequences: Neither Justifies Inaction
It is possible that firm limits at the level of the hospital may actually change the
public debate substantially. Currently, it is easy for public policy to assume that a hospital
will take responsibility for these patients based on the moral duty of the profession. The
idea that limits can fairly be set may lead, at some point, to a tragic consequence, but it
may also start a conversation about how to avoid further tragedy that could not exist
whilst this problem is obscured. My hope is that loss will not be a gross injustice but one
that has resulted from a reasonable process that, and furthermore, that this loss may
inspire people to see this issue as one that presents a moral claim to all of us in the
broader community, to address this issue by taking the notion of charity seriously, and
seeing to it that limitations are minimized, and all types of deserving persons are cared
for.
However, if this optimism is not justified in reality, this clear, rational process will
provide members of the hospital constituency a chance to act collectively in these matters
of injustice. Even without funding support from the federal government, the notion of
charity is too deeply grounded in medicine and in society at large—even if it is based in a
strong ambivalence—for no one to at least attempt to fill these gaps through charitable
donation, or collaboration between providers and institutions in the way I have suggested
in my analogy to the UNOS system. Bringing these problems to light may indeed cause
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positive or negative consequences in public policy, but that sphere is less likely to reflect
the kind of nuanced, social solution to the problem that may be reached locally, however
in tension these efforts are with federal policy and immigration law.
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APPENDIX I. CONNECTICUT FREE BED FUNDS

YNHH

Free Bed
Funds

Expendit
ures

Total CT
expend

of total
CT

DSH
Payments

Yale
Exp^

State
avg.^

FY 2001

36,676,957

680,210

3,319,782

20.5%

28,006,587

1.9%

2.8%

FY 2002

23,524,093

571,215

5,279,746

10.8%

31,009,553

2.4%

5.5%

FY 2003*

25,897,318

541,550

7,900,494

6.9%

23,805,540

2.1%

7.8%

FY 2004

25,977,098

2,622,182

13,043,185

20.1%

24,629,764

10.1%

11.1%

FY 2005

25,977,098

4,721,870

10,933,759

43.2%

17,207,806

18.2%

9.4%

FY 2006

20,187,870

6,893,000

13,492,854

51.1%

26,248,183

34.1%

8.2%

FY 2007

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

FY 2008

16,208,569

3,901,514

—

—

—

24.1%

—

FY 2009

11,321,005

813,615

—

—

—

7.2%

—

FY 2010

9,993,532

834,500

—

—

—

8.4%

—

* Year of Quinton White controversy and AG Blumenthal’s charity fund misuse lawsuit
was filed in 2003.
^ Hartford Hospital, Connecticut’s second largest charity care provider, which combined
with Yale provide more than 70% of the average annual charity care, spends, by
comparison, between 2.5 and 10.7% of its funds on a yearly basis, without the upward
trend seen in Yale’s figures.
(Sources: Connecticut Health Policy Project; Office of Health Care Access, Connecticut
Deptartment of Public Health)
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